A common objection to the idea of any sort of transcendent domain is that, if that domain can affect the physical domain, then it is simply an extension of the physical domain and therefore not transcendent. As such, truly transcendent domains do not exist.

When discussing supernatural claims in particular, this argument is often used to assert that there is no such thing as the supernatural because if it can affect the natural, then it is simply a part of nature. Similarly, this argument is used to disprove mind-brain dualism since, if the mind can affect the world (specifically, the brain), then the mind cannot be immaterial because it is interacting with the material.

This objection makes sense at some level, but also seems to miss the mark when it comes to explaining the phenomena that people refer to when invoking transcendent domains like the supernatural or the mind. Even if the assertion is logically valid, it has no explanatory power and adds no detail to support exploration, model creation, testing, or any other sort of careful thinking.

Even when domains are fundamentally similar in some way, understanding is usually improved by articulating persistent differences and the nature of any boundaries and interactions.